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8.1  Introduction 
Practical macroeconomics gives a simple and direct answer to the question in 
the title of this chapter: monetary policy should regulate aggregate demand to 
stabilize output and inflation. Stabilizing output is presumed to eliminate the 
“Okun gaps” that arise from changes in aggregate demand when prices are 
sticky. Low and stable inflation is widely viewed as an important policy goal: 
high and variable inflation is taken to increase relative price variability as well as 
increasing other costs of production and exchange. To determine how to balance 
Okun gaps against costs of inflation-either  in level or variability-it  is neces- 
sary to assume a loss function for the monetary policy authority. While the 
specific form of the loss function plays a key role in determining the details of 
optimal monetary policy, a general presumption is that optimal policy involves 
variability in both inflation and real economic activity. From this standard per- 
spective, a monetary policy that is directed principally toward stabilizing the 
price level-as  proposed in the Mack bill-appears  obviously inefficient. 
Robert G. King is the Carter Glass Professor of Economics and the Robert P.  Black Research 
Professor of Economics at the University of Virginia. He is also a consultant to the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Richmond and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Alex- 
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The views expressed here are the authors’ and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Richmond or  the Federal Reserve System. The authors would like to thank Mike Dotsey and 
Andreas Hornstein for helpful and detailed discussions. They have also received useful questions 
and suggestions from many people, including Charles Evans, Aubhik Khan, Ellen McGrattan, Lars 
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1. The Mack hill refers to S.611,  a bill introduced before the 105th Congress on 17 April 1997, 
which would “require the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to focus on price 
stability in establishing monetary policy.” 
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In this chapter, we  provide a simple yet  fully articulated macroeconomic 
model where this intuition is incorrect. In our model economy, macroeconomic 
equilibrium is inefficient because producers have market power and Okun gaps 
can arise as a result of price stickiness. However, the monetary authority should 
nevertheless make the price level the sole objective of monetary policy. Fur- 
ther, the price level stabilization policy is optimal in a very specific sense: it 
maximizes the utility of the representative individual in the economy. To derive 
this result, we draw on two broad areas of recent literature. 
First, we use the standard public finance approach to policy analysis. While 
this approach is little used in practical macroeconomics, it is being increas- 
ingly applied in dynamic macroeconomic theory.* In general, the public fi- 
nance approach focuses on identifying distortions and measuring the resulting 
costs to individuals, which are sometimes called “Harberger triangles.” Op- 
timal  policy  then  involves trading off  various distortions-minimizing  the 
sum of the Harberger triangles-given  the available policy instruments. Practi- 
cal macroeconomics has tended to deviate from the public finance approach 
because  the  conventional  wisdom-famously  articulated  by  James  Tobin 
(1977)-is  that “it takes a heap of Harberger triangles to fill an Okun gap.” 
Okun gaps were seen by Tobin and many  others as fundamentally different 
phenomena, not amenable to being studied with public finance tools because 
they did not involve microeconomic distortions. 
Second, we draw on recent developments in “New Keynesian” macroeco- 
nomics that provide a microstructure for sticky prices and thus facilitate the 
unified approach to policy analysis. Our model economy contains two central 
New  Keynesian features: an explicit modeling of  imperfect competition in 
product markets and an optimizing approach to sticky  price^.^ We then embed 
these price-setting mechanisms in a dynamic general equilibrium model, of the 
form studied in real business cycle research. This “new neoclassical synthesis” 
framework is more and more widely used for the positive analysis of the busi- 
ness cycle but is just beginning to be employed for the study of optimal mone- 
tary p01icy.~  Models using the framework have a well-defined Okun gap that 
can fluctuate through time with aggregate demand, but Harberger-type analysis 
is nonetheless the appropriate way to identify distortions and characterize opti- 
mal policy. This is because Okun gaps can be interpreted as arising from micro- 
economic distortions. Specifically, with  some prices fixed, nominal distur- 
2. Notable contributions include Lucas and Stokey (1983), Judd (1985), Chamley (1986), and 
Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991). 
3. The imperfect competition approach to product markets has been developed by a number of 
authors, notably Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) and Rotemberg (1987). The optimizing approach 
to sticky prices has also been an area of extensive research, with some important contributions 
being Calvo (1983), Rotemberg (1982), and Yun (1996). 
4. See Goodfriend and King (1997) for a summary of these ongoing developments in business 
cycle modeling. There is a much smaller literature on optimal monetary policy in this class of 
models, which includes Ireland (1995, 1996, 1997), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997; chap. 2 of 
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bances affect the markup of  price over  marginal cost. The markup  is the 
economy’s terms of  trade between output and inputs and is a key distortion 
that can be influenced by  real and nominal ~hocks.~  In particular, changes in 
output  that  result  from  nominal  disturbances are  always  accompanied by 
changes in the markup. 
The approach that we take differs from those taken in other chapters in this 
volume. While we are making progress on building a small-scale, fully articu- 
lated macroeconomic model that can be used for the twin purposes of  ex- 
plaining postwar U.S. data and conducting simulations of  alternative policy 
rules, we do not yet have a specific quantitative model that we use to identify 
the main sources of economic fluctuations. For this reason, we cannot ask the 
questions that are posed in many other chapters, such as “What is the trade-off 
between inflation variability and output variability, under alternative specifica- 
tions of the interest rate rule?’ However, we can study optimal policy within a 
basic macroeconomic model that captures central features of a broad class of 
models. Our analysis of optimal policy is centered on questions that are related 
to those in other chapters: 
What  is the optimal monetary policy response to  a particular structural 
What are the implications of this optimal policy response for output, infla- 
As a by-product of answering these questions, we also learn about the opti- 
mal long-run rate of inflation. Our findings can be summed up in remarkably 
simple terms: both in the long run and in response to higher frequency shocks, 
optimal monetary policy involves stabilizing the price level. Intuitively, it is 
perhaps not surprising that sticky prices make it optimal for the price level not 
to vary. After all, if the price level never changes, then in a sense it does not 
matter whether prices are sticky. By  studying a simple model in detail in this 
chapter, we work toward understanding the broader circumstances in which 
this intuition is correct. While we focus on productivity shocks in our discus- 
sion, we have applied our approach to aggregate demand shocks (government 
purchase shocks and preference shocks) and to money demand shocks: all of 
these shocks lead to the same simple message about the importance of stabiliz- 
ing the price level. 
Our model does imply that there is an optimal interest rate rule, which takes 
a simple form. Since the price level never changes under optimal policy, the 
nominal rate set by the monetary authority must track the underlying real rate 
that would prevail under price flexibility. We  show how to make this interest 
rate rule consistent with price level determinacy by  incorporating a simple 
shock, such as a productivity shock? 
tion, and interest rates? 
5. This theme is developed in more detail in Goodfriend and King (1997). The idea that all 
effects of monetary policy in “new synthesis” models can be interpreted as relative price distor- 
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specification of how the monetary authority would respond to deviations of the 
price level from its path under optimal policy. 
Relative to other chapters in this volume, the approach we take is most simi- 
lar to that of Rotemberg and Woodford in chapter 2. Both chapters use as their 
analytical framework an optimizing sticky price model; both also use the repre- 
sentative agent’s expected utility as the welfare criterion. Where we differ from 
our compatriots is in the treatment of steady state distortions. Rotemberg and 
Woodford assume that fiscal or other mechanisms eliminate the monopolistic 
competition distortion in steady state, so that  distortions only arise out of 
steady state. We  assume that monetary policy is the only tool available for 
combating distortions, in or out of steady state. Further, we find that the policy 
of  stabilizing the price level is optimal even when there are large steady state 
distortions. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 8.2 we lay out the basic model, 
which features staggered price setting. In section 8.3, we illustrate the nonneu- 
tralities that occur in our model, including the effects of  sustained (steady 
state) inflation and the effects of  various monetary shocks. Section 8.4 dis- 
cusses the nature of constraints on the monetary authority, which we interpret 
as constraints on allocations that a social planner can choose. In section 8.5, 
we lay out the nature of the (real) optimum problem for that social planner. In 
section 8.6, we determine that the steady state solution to this problem involves 
real allocations that would be achieved in a market economy only under a zero 
inflation rate, a result that we call a modified golden rule for monetary policy. 
In section 8.7, we  discuss the nature of  optimal allocations in an economy 
with productivity shocks, under the assumption that the monetary authority 
can credibly commit to future actions; optimal allocations again involve price 
level stability. However, imperfect competition means that there are tempta- 
tions for the monetary authority to abandon the price level policy, and we ex- 
plore this issue quantitatively in section 8.8. Section 8.9 discusses the nature 
of an interest rate rule that would achieve the optimal outcomes. Section 8.10 
concludes. 
8.2  A Macromodel with Staggered Price Setting 
The macroeconomic model assumes that final product prices are set opti- 
mally  by  monopolistically competitive firms, which  satisfy all demand at 
posted prices. The model is in the tradition of Taylor (1980), in that price set- 
ting is staggered: each firm sets its price for J periods with  1/J of  the firms 
adjusting each period. In common with Taylor’s model, monetary policy mat- 
ters because stickiness in individual prices gives rise to stickiness in the price 
level, and hence to nonneutrality.6  In our exposition of this model, we focus on 
the case in which there is two-period pricing setting, but we discuss extensions 
6.  Taylor (1980) focused on nominal rigidity in wages rather than prices. The methods that are 
used in this paper could also be applied to such environments. 353  What Should the Monetary Authority Do When Prices Are Sticky? 
for larger J and richer time-dependent price-setting schemes at various places 
below. 
The model is designed to be representative of recent work on the new neo- 
classical synthesis, in that New Keynesian-style  price stickiness is introduced 
into an economy with otherwise neoclassical features including intertemporal 
optimization on the part of households and firms. However, five features de- 
serve special attention. First, we abstract from capital accumulation to simplify 
the analysis as much as po~sible.~  Second, we assume that the production func- 
tion for all final products is constant returns in the single variable factor, labor, 
to approximate the relationship between output and input in a more realistic 
model in which firms can simultaneously vary labor and capacity utilization 
(see Dotsey, King, and Wolman 1997). Third, we use a form of preferences for 
the representative agent that allows for an arbitrarily high labor supply elastic- 
ity in response to monetary disturbances, while retaining a zero response of 
labor input to productivity disturbances if prices are flexible. This permits our 
model to generate large and persistent effects of money on output.8 Fourth, 
we abstract from money demand distortions associated with positive nominal 
interest rates (triangles under the money demand curve). There are two motiva- 
tions for this assumption. Empirically, transactions balances increasingly bear 
interest, so that this abstraction is increasingly more realistic. Theoretically, 
this assumption allows us to focus completely on the effects of monetary pol- 
icy that operate through sticky prices. Fifth, we abstract from fiscal policy, by 
assuming that lump-sum taxes and transfers are available to offset changes in 
the money supply. The joint determination of optimal monetary and fiscal pol- 
icy with sticky prices is an interesting issue, and one on which considerable 
progress has been made by Yun (1  994). We focus on monetary policy in order 
to clearly exposit the basic implications of price stickiness and also because 
we think that current policy structures assign the task of stabilization policy to 
the monetary authority in most countries. 
As exposited in this section, the model is one in which monopolistically 
competitive firms set their prices every two periods, but the conclusions we 
reach apply to arbitrary patterns of staggered price setting. There is a contin- 
uum of these firms, and they produce differentiated consumption goods using 
as the sole input labor provided by consumers at a competitive wage. Consum- 
7. In the case of  two-period price setting, this simplication should allow us to derive analytical 
results for our model, but we have not yet worked these out. 
8. Models with sticky prices have the generic feature that persistence of  the real effect of  a 
monetary shock is almost completely determined by  the change in the incentive to adjust price 
induced by  the shock. 'Qpical preference specifications generate large changes in this incentive, 
and hence real effects that do not persist. In contrast, the preferences used here create only small 
incentives to adjust, and hence persistent effects of the shock. We use this preference specification 
because we believe that monetary shocks do have persistent real effects empirically, arising from 
economic mechanisms that enhance the supply responsiveness of the economy to nominal distur- 
bances. Some New Keynesian economists-such  as Ball and Romer (1990) and Jeanne (1998)- 
would argue that this preference specification is proxying for institutional features of the labor 
market, such as efficiency wages, that are ultimately responsible for enhancing nonneutrality and 
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ers are infinitely lived and purchase consumption goods using income from 
their labor and income from firms' profits. Consumers also must hold money 
in order to consume, although we assume that money bears a near competitive 
rate of interest, so that there are no distortions associated with money demand. 
8.2.1  Consumers 
Consumers have preferences over a consumption aggregate (c,)  and leisure 
(1 -  n,) given by 
In this specification and below, a, is a random preference shifter that also acts 
as a productivity  hock.^ 
Microstructure of  Consumption 
As in Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) and Rotemberg (1987), we  assume 
that every producer faces a downward-sloping demand curve with elasticity E. 
With a continuum of firms, the consumption aggregate is an integral of differ- 
entiated products 
c,  = (I  c(  W)(E-l)/E  dW)EI(E-l) 
as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). 
Focusing on the case in which prices are fixed for just two periods, and 
noting that all producers that adjust their prices in a given period choose the 
same price, we can write the consumption aggregate as 
where c,,, is the quantity consumed in period t of a good whose price was set 




c,,,  = (?-I  c, , 
9. It may seem unusual to have the same random variable shifting both preferences and technol- 
ogy. In order for eq. (2) to be consistent with balanced growth occurring through growth in technol- 
ogy, it must be that the preference and productivity shifters grow at the same rate. We also assume 
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where P,,, is the nominal price at time t of  any good whose price was set j 
periods ago and P, is the price index at time t,  which is given by 
Intertemporal  Optimization 
Consumers choose contingency plans for consumption demand and labor 
supply to maximize expected utility (l), subject to an intertemporal budget 
constraint, 
In this expression, the uses of  the individual's date t wealth are consumption 
(c,),  acquisition of money balances (M,/P,)  and nominal one-period bonds (B,/ 
PI),  and purchases of shares s, in the representative firm at price v,. The sources 
of  wealth are current labor income win,, the value of  previous-period money 
balances (1 + RE,)(M,-l/Pt)  and maturing bonds (1 + R,-l)(B,-l/PJ,  and the 
value of previous-period asset holdings, including current profits (z,).  The in- 
terest rate on bonds is endogenous, while the monetary authority pays interest 
on money at a rate RY  marginally below R,. In terms of  this asset structure, 
there are two additional points to be made. First, the representative firm  is an 
average (portfolio) of firms that set prices at different prior periods. Second, in 
equilibrium, asset prices must adjust so that s, = 1. 
The first-order conditions for the household's optimal choice problem for 
the allocation of consumption and leisure over time arelo 
(7) 
In these expressions, A, measures the utility value of a unit of  real income at 
date t (the multiplier on the asset accumulation constraint), and the marginal 
utility  of  consumption is equated to it. The marginal disutility of  work  is 
equated to w,XI, where w,  is the real wage rate. 
10. In appendix A of this paper, we describe the representative agent's choice problem in detail, 
with money demand motivated by a transactions time requirement. In this extended setting, condi- 
tions (7) and (8) are limiting versions when there is a small marginal cost of  transacting, as we 
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Although there is intertemporal choice of consumption and leisure, the as- 
sumed form of preferences means that there is a simple labor supply function, 
which is related solely to the real wage rate at date t. To derive this labor supply 
function, note that the utility function implies that 
Equating the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption to 
the real wage yields a labor supply function with a constant wage elasticity 
(equal to Uy): 
(9) 
Labor supply is raised by the real wage and lowered by the productivity shifter, 
so there is no trend growth in hours worked when the real wage and productiv- 
ity have a common trend. 
Money Demand 
of his purchases: 
(10)  M,  =  kec,. 
We think of this money demand function as a limiting case that applies when 
money is interest bearing, when there is a satiation level of cash balances (k) 
per unit of consumption, and the interest rate on money is close to the market 
rate. In such a setting, we should be able to ignore the “triangles under the 
demand curve for money” in order to focus on other costs of inflation.“ 
Other Financial Assets 
Consumers also hold a diversified portfolio of shares in the monopolistically 
competitive firms, which pays dividends equal to the firms’ monopoly profits. 
The real and nominal interest rates in this economy are governed by Fisherian 
principles. The real interest rate, rt,  must satisfy 
The representative consumer must hold enough money to cover the quantity 
11. Wolman’s (1997) estimates of a “transactions technology”-based  money demand function 
indicate the presence of  a satiation level of cash balances per unit of  consumption. They also 
indicate that most of the welfare gains from reducing average inflation from 5 percent to the Fried- 
man rule are gained by making inflation zero. 357  What Should the Monetary Authority Do When Prices Are Sticky? 
and the nominal interest rate, R,, must satisfy 
8.2.2  Firms 
subject to random variation in productivity: 
Each firm produces with an identical technology that is linear in labor and 
(13)  C1.I  =  aln,,,’ 
where nj.,  is the labor input employed in period t by a firm whose price was set 
in period t -  j.  Given the price that a firm is charging, it hires enough labor to 
meet the demand for its product at that price. Firms that do not adjust their 
prices in a given period can thus be thought of as passive, whereas firms that 
adjust their prices do so optimally. 
Firms  set their prices to maximize the present discounted value of  their 
profits. Given that it has a relative price pl,,  = PJP,,  real profit zj,,  for a firm of 
type j is 
(14)  Z1.r  =  P1,r‘in,.i  - 
that is, revenue less cost. To  derive later results, it is useful to define real mar- 
ginal cost +,,  which is equal to w,/u,  in our setting. Then profit for a firm of 
type j is 
(15)  Z1.r  =  P~”,C,(P,,- 
using the requirement that demand equal output (cj,,  =  p,;‘  c, = urnj,,). 
Optimal Pricing without Price Stickiness 
If prices were fully flexible, then a familiar set of expressions would govern 
optimal pricing in this constant elasticity, constant marginal cost world. Opti- 
mal monopoly pricing is illustrated in figure 8.1. Panel 8.la shows the demand 
curve for the firm, p,~~c~,  under the assumption that the level of aggregate de- 
mand is unity (c, = 1) and the demand elasticity is four (E = 4). Panel 8.lb 
shows profit as a function of  the relative price. The relative price that maxi- 
mizes profit is given by a. demand 
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In drawing the diagram, we  have assumed real marginal cost is (E - 1)/&  so 
that the optimal relative price is unity. 
Panel 8.lc shows the marginal revenue and marginal cost schedules that 
are relevant when the monopoly problem is written with price as the decision 
variable, rather than quantity as in the standard textbook presentation. Mar- 
ginal revenue is negative, as the elasticity of demand must exceed one for the 
profit maximization problem to make sense (marginal revenue is (1 -  ~)p~;&cJ. 
For low levels of  the relative price, marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost 
(-E~/T,~--'c,+~)  and it is desirable to raise the price. Correspondingly, for high 
levels of  the relative price, marginal revenue is less than marginal cost and 
profits could be increased by lowering the relative price. 
Our model economy is one in which there are substantial real consequences 
of  the market power shown in figure 8.1. In constructing this figure and in 
conducting simulations, the assumption that the demand elasticity is 4 implies 
a steady state markup of  1.33 when there is no price stickiness (or zero infla- 
tion). Combined with a highly elastic supply of labor (7 = 0.10), this implies 
that output is about 6 percent of its efficient level.12 While this level of distor- 
tion is certainly too high, the extreme assumption does serve to stress that our 
results on optimal policy are valid for economies in which there are substantial 
departures of  output from its efficient level and large effects of  money on 
output. 
Optimal Price Setting When Prices Are Sticky 
Maximization of present value implies that a firm chooses its current relative 
price taking into account the effect on current and expected future profits. 
When it sets its nominal price at t, the firm knows that its relative price will 
move through time according to 
where II,,, is the gross inflation rate between t and t + 1 (II,,,  = P,+,/P,).  That 
is: if there is positive inflation, the firm expects that its relative price will fall 
as a result of the fact that it has a nominal price that is fixed for two periods.I3 
The optimal relative price must balance effects on profits today and tomor- 
row, given that inflation erodes the relative price. Formally, an optimal relative 
price satisfies 
12. The marginal rate of substitution, -D,u  (c,, n,, a,)/D,u(c,,  n,, a,) is equal to a,8n: and the real 
wage rate is equal to a,lp., where p. is the average markup of  price over marginal cost. Accordingly, 
the ratio of labor to its efficient level is given by n,ln* = p.-I'y.  The calculation in the text assumes 
that y = 0.10 and p. = 1.33. 
13. If the nominal price that the firm charges is Po,,  = PI,,+,,  thenp,, = P  ,,,,  /P,  andp,,,,, = P,,,+,/ 
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Fig. 8.2  Optimal pricing with stickiness 
Multiplying  equation (17) by p,,,  yields a more symmetric form of the effi- 
ciency condition that will be convenient for deriving optimal policy: 
Figure 8.2 shows two central aspects of  this efficiency condition  (this figure 
repeats panel c of figure 8.  I but adds some additional information). First, the 
marginal profit terms in equation (1  8) are gaps between marginal revenue and 
marginal cost at t and t + 1: with price stickiness, the firm can no longer make 
these both zero, but it can choose its price to balance the gaps through time. 
Second, figure 8.2 shows a firm setting a relative price po  that is too high rela- 
tive to the  static optimum-in  the sense that marginal revenue is less than 
marginal cost-and  a related price pI  that is too low. This would be an optimal 
policy, for example, in a steady state situation of sustained inflation. Efficient 
price setting equates the boxes marked A and B, which correspond to the con- 
sumption value of profits lost at t, which is po.t .  &@,,,  c,, +,/dp0,,  in equation 
(IS), and the profits lost at t + 1, which is  *  d~(p~,,+~,  c,+~,  IJJ,+,)/~~~,~+~.‘~ 
14. Technically, we must have A, = A,,,  and p = I, as well as n > I  to use our diagram exactly. 361  What Should the Monetary Authority Do When Prices Are Sticky? 
As in Taylor's (1980) model, there is a forward-looking form of the price 
equation that can be developed. Using the expressions for marginal revenue 
and marginal cost, we can show that the optimal price is 
Thus equation (1  8) implicitly links the current relative price chosen by a price- 
setting firm to current and future marginal cost, as well as expected inflation 
and interest rates. Further, near zero inflation, this expression is well approxi- 
mated by 
1 
log Po,,  =  log (L)  +  ~  +  *, 
E- 1 
which is even more like Taylor's forward-looking specification.  Approximately, 
therefore, an adjusting firm sets a relative price that is a weighted average of 
the real marginal cost it expects over the next two periods, with a correction 
for the effect of expected inflation. 
8.3  Influences of Money on Economic Activity 
In this section, we discuss how monetary policy affects economic activity 
in our model. Before getting into the details, however, it is useful to think about 
why a monetary authority might seek to influence economic activity in this 
type of model. The rationale is as follows. Since there is monopolistic competi- 
tion, there is a positive markup of price over marginal cost even without sticky 
prices. The markup is an inefficiency, as it implies that the resource cost of 
producing the marginal good is below the utility benefit of consuming the mar- 
ginal g00d.I~  As stressed by  Mankiw (1990) and Romer (1993), it is conse- 
quently desirable to have policies that expand aggregate economic activity, if 
such policies are feasible. Sticky prices give the monetary authority some abil- 
ity to alter the markup and to thus expand or contract economic activity, al- 
though we will see below that there are severe limitations on that ability in the 
long run. Sticky prices also introduce the possibility of  a second distortion, 
namely, variation in the relative prices of the differentiated products. Because 
the differentiated products are produced using a common production technol- 
ogy, efficiency dictates that their relative prices should be identical. However, 
15. An alternative, equally valid interpretation is that the marginal product of labor exceeds the 
marginal payment to labor, as measured by the real wage. 362  Robert G. King and Alexander L. Wolman 
since some nominal prices are prohibited  from adjusting in a given period, 
relative prices will not be identical for all goods if firms that are able to adjust 
their nominal prices choose to do so. This situation will occur, for example, if 
there is a nonzero inflation rate. 
8.3.1  Effects of  Steady Inflation 
The effect of steady inflation on the two distortions-the  relative price dis- 
tortion and the markup distortion-can  be seen by referring to the equations 
for the price index and the optimal price of an adjusting firm. The relative price 
distortion is minimized (eliminated, in fact) at a zero inflation rate, and the 
markup distortion is minimized at a slightly positive inflation rate. The fact 
that these distortions are not invariant to steady state inflation means that the 
model exhibits nonsuperneutrality, or, in the lingo of sticky price models, a 
nonvertical long-run Phillips curve. As will be shown below, however, the long- 
run Phillips curve is nearly vertical. Furthermore, there is a negative relation- 
ship between inflation and output over most positive inflation rates. We analyze 
the effect of steady inflation on relative price distortions first and then turn to 
its effect on the markup distortion. 
Relative Price Distortions 
To begin, if the gross inflation rate is n = Pf/Pr-],  then the ratio of relative 
prices of adjusting and nonadjusting firms is II = P,,t/Po,r-l.  That is, with posi- 
tive and steady inflation an adjusting firm in the current period sets its nominal 
price at a level II times greater than a firm that adjusted in the previous period. 
Further, from equation (3,  the price index in steady state is 
so the ratio P,/P-which  can be thought of  as a measure of the variation in 
relative prices-is  increasing in inflation (since POP  = [(I + IIE-1)/2]1’(E-1)). 
Variation in relative prices implies that there is a gap between potential and 
actual consumption, where potential consumption is the maximum quantity of 
the consumption aggregate that can be obtained from a given level of technol- 
ogy and labor input. Since the aggregator, c(c,,,,  cl,r),  is concave and symmetric, 
potential consumption corresponds to equal quantities of each of the different 
goods. However, equal quantities will be chosen by individuals only if there is 
no variation in relative prices, and since zero inflation equates relative prices, 
it achieves potential consumption. Mathematically, equations (3) and (4) can 
be manipulated  to show that in steady state, the ratio of actual to potential 
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which uses the fact that potential consumption is simply the linear index of 
consumption, cp = c,/2  + c,/2.  Expression (21) confirms that with price sta- 
bility (II = l),  actual and potential consumption are equal, whereas the relative 
price variation induced by inflation makes actual consumption less than poten- 
tial. The relative price distortion is quite small at low inflation rates. 
Average Markup Distortion 
The effect of inflation on the average markup can be seen by combining the 
price index with the steady state version of the optimal price equation (19). In 
our economy, as in others with marginal cost that is common across firms, the 
average markup (p)  is simply the inverse of real marginal cost. Using this fact, 
the optimal price equation becomes 
p,  =  PZ[L)(  1 +  pm  ). 
E - 1  p  1 +  pnc-1 
When we combine this expression with the price index, P = P,[(l  + IP1)/ 
2]1’1-F,  the average markup is 
1 +  prI. 
E-  1  1 +  prI-’ 
= L[l  +;e-l)  I/(  I-E  ) (  1. 
The inflation  rate  therefore  affects the  average  markup,  with  the  “static” 
markup E/(E -  1) resulting from zero inflation (II = 1). 
There are two components in the inflation-markup  link. Higher  inflation 
makes adjusting firms choose a higher markup when they do adjust, but it also 
makes the markup of nonadjusting firms erode more severely. In general, for 
high enough inflation the effect on adjusting firms dominates, so that higher 
inflation is associated with a higher markup. While these counteracting effects 
are qualitatively interesting, figure 8.3a shows that they are small in the follow- 
ing sense. When E = 4, the steady state markup is minimized at an extremely 
low inflation rate (approximately 1 percent annually), and this result carries 
over to any reasonable degree of market power (higher or lower than E = 4); 
furthermore, for a given value of  E,  the markup is essentially insensitive to 
inflation. That is: over the inflation rates shown in figure 8.3, which are be- 
tween -  1 and 2 percent at an annual rate, the markup changes only at the fifth 
digit (see the markup scale in fig. 8.3a).I6 
Since the relative price distortion is eliminated at zero inflation, it follows 
that steady state welfare is maximized at some @flation rate between zero and 
that which minimizes the markup. We define n to be the inflation rate that 
16. Goodfriend and King (1997) perform a similar calculation with a model of  four-quarter 
price stickiness and a wider range of inflation rates. They find that the average markup rises more 
rapidly at higher rates of inflation. 364  Robert G. King and Alexander L. Wolman 
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Fig. 8.3  Steady state 
maximizes  steady  state welfare;  it is illustrated  in figure 8.3b, which plots 
steady state welfare as a function of inflation. 
8.3.2 
There are two central implications of New Keynesian macroeconomic mod- 
els beginning with Taylor (1980). First, there can be large and persistent effects 
of changes in money. Second, it is crucial to specify the dynamic nature of the 
monetary change and the corresponding beliefs that agents hold. To  display 
these crucial implications in our context, we close the model by adding a policy 
rule. For expository purposes, we begin by assuming an exogenous process for 
the money growth rate and examining responses to two types of shocks. First, 
we look at a persistent increase in the money growth rate, but one that ulti- 
mately  dies away so that trend inflation is unaffected. Second, we look at a 
permanent  decrease in the money growth rate, which results in a permanent 
reduction in the inflation rate. Then, because monetary policy in the industrial- 
ized countries is generally conducted with an interest rate instrument, we ex- 
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Fig. 8.4  Unanticipated, persistent increase in money growth 
Note:  x-Axes in quarters; y-axes  in percentage deviations from steady state, except panel d, which 
is in basis points at an annual rate. 
amine the effect of  a temporary policy shock when policy is given by an inter- 
est rate feedback rule. 
Effects of a Persistent Increase in Money Growth 
As illustrated in figure 8.4, an unanticipated persistent increase in the money 
growth rate generates a persistent increase in output, as money growth exceeds 
inflation for several periods. (The policy shock corresponds to a 1 percent in- 
crease in money on impact and ultimately a 2 percent increase in the level of 
money).”  There are two complementary ways of  thinking about the output 
17. Technically, the driving process for money is log M, -  log M,-, = ‘/2 (log M,-I -  log M,-J 
+ <,, with 5,  being a sequence of  random shocks. 366  Robert G. King and Alexander L. Wolman 
expansion, which begins with an immediate increase in output of  about two- 
thirds of a percent and then dies away through time. First, the monetary expan- 
sion produces an increase in aggregate demand, which is accommodated by 
firms that are holding prices fixed (the strength of this aggregate demand effect 
can be measured as the distance between the money and price responses). Sec- 
ond, the increase in output reflects the monetary authority's ability to change 
the extent of distortions in the economy and relative prices. In particular, the 
average markup falls in the face of a monetary expansion. Since the average 
markup is the reciprocal of real marginal cost (p  = P/(PJI)  = 14)  and since 
marginal cost is the real wage divided by labor productivity (JI, = w,/a,),  there 
is a corresponding rise in the real wage that stimulates aggregate supply. Given 
an assumed high-amplitude response of labor supply to wages, this decline in 
the markup results in a significant expansion of aggregate output. On net, the 
monetary authority has stimulated the economy by driving down the markup 
temporarily, taking advantage of preset prices. 
One notable feature of this dynamic response, as in Taylor (1980), is that the 
persistence in real variables is much greater than the duration of fixed prices. 
Recent research by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1996) has stressed that this 
persistence in real output requires that increases in output carry with them only 
small increases in marginal cost. In our example economy in figure 8.4 the labor 
supply is highly elastic, which translates into low elasticity of marginal cost 
with respect to output. More specifically, the elasticity of real marginal cost with 
respect to output is y, and figure 8.4 was generated with y = 0.1  .Is  We use this 
specification throughout the current analysis, as we think that a more complete 
macroeconomic model with variable capacity utilization and indivisible labor 
may generate a large and persistent effect of monetary shocks.Iy 
Another notable feature of this response is the behavior of the nominal inter- 
est rate, which exhibits a persistent increase, reflecting mainly the behavior of 
expected inflation. It is a general feature of sticky price models that persistent 
increases in the money supply generate persistent increases in expected infla- 
tion, and usually the nominal interest rate. This result is troubling if  one be- 
lieves that monetary policy is appropriately modeled by an exogenous money 
growth rate, as it conflicts with the conventional wisdom that expansionary 
monetary policy involves a decrease in the nominal interest rate. We will see 
below that if policy is modeled as an interest rate feedback rule, then expan- 
sionary (contractionary) shocks do generate decreases (increases) in the nomi- 
nal interest rate. 
18. In contrast to the preference specification used here, the more standard form (In c -  6n"Y) 
implies an elasticity of real marginal cost with respect to output that is at least unity, due to the 
income effect on labor supply. 
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Unanticipated, permanent decrease in money growth 
Effects oja  Permanent Decrease in Injation 
Figure 8.5 contains impulse response functions for an unanticipated perma- 
nent decrease in the money growth rate. Aside from the sign difference, these 
responses look similar to figure 8.4, confirming the standard notion that disin- 
flation is costly with sticky prices. However, it is important to stress two fea- 
tures of  this policy shock. First, the magnitude of  the temporary aggregate 
contraction is smaller, about half as large as in figure 8.4. Second, the sustained 
deflation also has a long-run effect on relative prices and relative quantities as 
individuals substitute across goods. The initial steady state inflation rate in 
figure 8.5 is zero, so a permanent decrease in inflation raises the markup per- 
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Anticipated, permanent decrease in money growth 
Ball (1995) has stressed that sticky price models generally imply that there 
is a very different effect of a credible anticipated disinflation: our model is no 
exception. As illustrated in figure 8.6, an anticipated deflation is expansionary: 
consumption actually rises for several periods. This expansion occurs because 
firms act in advance of the policy change, lowering their relative prices now 
because they know that future inflation will be lower. Since figure 8.6 assumes 
that the starting point is zero inflation, agents will be in a worse steady state in 
the long run (the markup will be slightly higher), with lower consumption and 
higher  leisure.  However,  during the  transition  they  benefit  from  a  lower 
markup and corresponding higher level of output. As with figure 8.5, however, 
it is again the case that the effect of  a sustained deflation is smaller than the 
effect of a temporary change in the money growth rate, even though both dis- 369  What Should the Monetary Authority Do When Prices Are Sticky? 
turbances are normalized to have the same (1 percent) effect on money in the 
initial period. That is: the forward-looking price setting built into this model 
implies that the effects of anticipated and unanticipated changes in the trend 
inflation rate are smaller than the effects of shocks that are not permanent. 
Effects of  an Interest Rate Shock 
It is straightforward to analyze how the model behaves in response to policy 
shocks when policy is given by an interest rate rule, which is the more relevant 
case empirically. Suppose that instead of an exogenous money growth rate, the 
monetary policy rule specifies that 
(24)  R,  =  f.(lnc - In?)  +  e,, 
where R, is the nominal interest rate, PI is a target price level that either is 
constant or grows at a constant rate,fis a positive coefficient that describes the 
feedback from price level deviations to nominal interest rate changes, and el is 
a random variable that follows a stochastic process known to agents in the 
economy. Figure 8.7 illustrates the response of key variables to an unantici- 
pated decrease in el,  assuming that el follows an AR( 1) process with autoregres- 
sive coefficient 0.5. Such a decrease in R is an expansionary policy shock: 
while the nominal interest rate falls 100 basis points on impact and then climbs 
back to its steady state value, the money supply behaves almost as a mirror 
image, rising on impact by about 0.6 percent, and then falling back to its steady 
state level. Because the policy rule involves feedback from the price level in- 
stead of inflation, the money supply and the price level both return to their 
steady state levels.2o  It may seem puzzling at first that an expansionary policy 
shock generates an increase in the nominal interest rate with a money supply 
rule, but a decrease with an interest rate rule. The resolution lies in the behavior 
of the money supply in these two cases. With the money supply rule, an expan- 
sionary shock involves an initial increase in the money supply that is amplified 
over time, at a decreasing rate, until a steady state with a higher quantity of 
money has been reached. In contrast, with the interest rate feedback rule, an 
expansionary shock involves an initial increase in money that is reversed over 
time. The money rule thus leads to an increase in expected inflation following 
the initial unexpected rise in the price level, whereas the interest rate rule leads 
to a decrease in expected inflation. 
8.4  Constraints on Monetary Policy 
We now turn to the central topic of the paper, optimal monetary policy. That 
is, we turn to describing how the monetary authority should behave, having 
already described how the model economy behaves given specific monetary 
20. A similar rule with feedback from inflation rather than the price level would generate base 
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policy actions. To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we assume that there 
is a single shock to macroeconomic activity-an  aggregate shock to productiv- 
ity-in  this section. Later we discuss generalizing the analysis to accommo- 
date other types of  shocks. The objective of  optimal policy is to maximize 
welfare, that is, the representative agent’s lifetime utility. Absent monopolistic 
competition  and sticky prices, laissez faire would be an optimal policy, with 
any rate of inflation yielding the same welfare level. 
In our model, however, monopolistic competition and sticky prices are key 
features. In principle, the policymaker would like to offset the effects of mo- 
nopolistic competition  and sticky prices;  specifically, it would like to make 
relative prices behave as if these two frictions were absent. In pursuing this 
objective, the policymaker is constrained in two ways. First, the economy has 371  What Should the Monetary Authority Do When  Prices Are Sticky? 
exogenous technology and limited resources. Second, firms are monopolisti- 
cally competitive with sticky prices, and in setting prices they take into account 
the demand curves and marginal costs they expect to face. Firms’ expectations, 
in turn, depend on their beliefs about how policy is conducted. 
We assume that policy is conducted with commitment; the monetary author- 
ity chooses a state-contingent plan and sticks with it, even though the plan is 
time inconsistent. The policymaker in our model does not have access to a full 
set of  fiscal policy instruments. With such instruments it would be possible 
to achieve a first-best allocation; production subsidies financed by  lump-sum 
taxation  would  succeed in  offsetting the  effects of  imperfect competition. 
Alternatively, as in Yun  (1994), the combined fiscal and monetary authorities 
could be constrained to raise revenue with distorting taxes, so that the first-best 
allocation might not be achievable, but a combined Ramsey taxation approach 
applied. Rotemberg and Woodford, in chapter 2 of  this volume, assume that 
fiscal instruments are available to eliminate steady state distortions, leaving to 
monetary policy the job of business cycle stabilization. We  assume that there 
are no fiscal interventions available, and we impose no fiscal constraints on the 
monetary authority’s plans.21  That is: our objective is to isolate principles of 
optimal monetary policy without a complicating discussion of fiscal issues. 
Resource Constraints 
The constraints involving technology and resources are given by the produc- 
tion functions 
(25)  c,,,  5  a1fii.r  forj =  0, 1, 
the consumption aggregator 
and agents’ limited time endowments 
1  1 
2 
1  2 n,  =  +  ?n,,,.  (27) 
Implementation Constraint 
The monetary authority must choose quantities that are consistent with mo- 
nopolistic competition and sticky prices. In the current model with two-period 
price stickiness, the single constraint involving firms’ price setting is as fol- 
lows: quantities must be consistent with the fact that any firm adjusting its 
price will do so optimally. We  call this constraint an “implementation con- 
straint” because it describes how the monetary authority is constrained by the 
21. As  mentioned previously, the monetary authority does have lump-sum taxes available to 
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fact that it must induce sticky price, monopolistically competitive firms to im- 
plement its chosen quantities. 
The most convenient formulation of the implementation constraint is based 
on  the  requirement that  the present value of marginal  profits from a price 
change is zero (as in eq. [IS]): 
It is then straightforward to rewrite the implementation constraint in terms of 
real quantities only, without any nominal magnitudes or relative prices: 
(28) 
where x  is a function that involves real quantities only, as we discuss next. To 
derive this version of the constraint on the monetary authority, we use the de- 
mand function (c,,, =  p,;&c,)  to eliminate relative prices. We eliminate real mar- 
ginal cost by using its definition as w,/a,  and then use the equality between the 
real wage and the marginal rate of  substitution between consumption and lei- 
sure to eliminate the real wage. In the current model, the x  function reduces toz2 
x(co,,,c,,n,,a,) +  ~E,x(~,,l+,,~l+,,~l+,,~r+,)  =  0, 
In what sense is equation (28) a constraint on the policymaker? As a simple 
example, suppose the policymaker wanted to raise output through a monetary 
injection in period t. One rationale for the expansion might be that output is 
inefficiently low:  since some firms cannot adjust their prices, an increase in 
aggregate demand is desirable because it will raise output toward the efficient 
level. However, firms that do adjust their prices-both  in current and future 
periods-behave  according to equation (19), raising their prices in the face of 
an increase in demand. In this way  the behavior of  price-setting  firms con- 
strains (but does not eliminate) the monetary authority's  ability to manipulate 
real quantities. 
8.5  The Real Policy Problem 
To determine optimal monetary policy, we first determine choices for real 
activity  that  are optimal subject to  the resource and  implementation  con- 
straints. Subsequently, we determine the behavior of nominal variables and rel- 
ative prices that are consistent with these real quantities. While unusual in mac- 
roeconomics, this two-step  practice  is common in public  finance and other 
22. As above, we use A, to denote the marginal utility of consumption in period t.  As such, A, is 
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areas of  applied general equilibrium analysis. To make this problem relatively 
easy to state formally, we also ignore expectations throughout this section; in 
related work using a complete contingent markets approach, we have found 
that similar efficiency conditions describe optimal policy under uncertainty. 
Optimal policy under commitment can be found by writing a restricted so- 
cial planner's problem that involves maximizing expression (2) with a choice 
of  sequences for c0,,, cl,,,  c,, no.,, nl,l,  n,, subject to conditions (25)-(28).  The 
Lagrangian for this problem is 
We will discuss the various multipliers in this Lagrangian as they appear in the 
analysis below. 
8.5.1  Background to the Policy Problem 
The optimal policy problem described by equation (30) is a restricted plan- 
ner's problem because any social planner worth his or her salt would not be 
constrained by staggered price setting. To see how our specific restriction plays 
a role, we can imagine a series of problems with weaker restrictions. 
First, if we were to remove constraint (28), the problem would be that of a 
planner constrained only by  tastes and technology, as typically defined. The 
optimal allocations would make consumption at both types  of  firms equal 
(since the aggregator is concave and symmetric in these quantities). Further, 
the unrestricted social planner would choose aggregate consumption and work 
effort so that the marginal rate of substitution 
equaled the marginal rate of transformation a,. 
Second, consider an intermediate planner, who cannot overcome monopo- 
listic competition but can force firms to change their prices each period. In- 
stead  of  facing  constraint  (28), such  a  planner  would  face the  constraint 
x(c,, cr,  n,, a,) = 0. Symmetry and concavity of the aggregator c would again 374  Robert G. King and Alexander L. Wolman 
make it unambiguous that optimal policy would equate consumption across 
the differentiated products. However, the planner could no longer equate the 
marginal rate of substitution to a,  because this would not respect the implemen- 
tation constraint; that is, it would be inconsistent with monopolistic competi- 
tion. Considering this intermediate problem reveals that if monetary policy can 
cause consumption of  all the goods to be equated, it will have “undone” the 
price stickiness. We saw above, however, that it is price stickiness-combined 
with imperfect competition-that  gives the monetary authority some real le- 
verage in the economy. The monetary authority’s optimality conditions must 
then effectively involve balancing the distortions arising from price stickiness 
against the ability to affect real quantities. 
8.5.2  Optimality Conditions 
The first-order conditions for equation (30) can be written in the following 
time-invariant form if we define an artificial multiplier +- to enter several of 
the constraints at date t = 0; we return later to a more detailed discussion of 
the role of  this multiplier. Optimal choice of  the labor input at each type of 
firm implies 
and optimal choice of the consumption levels from each type of firm implies 
forj =  0, 1. 
Optimal choice of aggregate consumption and labor requires 
and 
In  addition to these quantity efficiency conditions, the first-order conditions 
include the constraints themselves, (25)-(28), which all will hold with equality. 
Note that for t = 0 we have introduced +-,  in equations (32)-(34),  whereas 
it is not present in equation (30). As in Kydland and Prescott (1980), the pur- 
pose of introducing this artificial multiplier is to have a convenient mathemati- 375  What Should the Monetary Authority Do When Prices Are Sticky? 
cal expression for the policymaker's problem in a world of commitment, as we 
discuss further below. With this multiplier in place, the efficiency conditions 
for a successor government at date t + 1 would take exactly the same form as 
those efficiency conditions for the current government that occur for t + 1, 
t + 2, and so forth. 
8.5.3  General Implications 
Some of the first-order conditions for our restricted social planning problem 
look just like those for an unrestricted social planner. For example, optimal 
labor allocations equate the utility-denominated price of a unit of each type of 
good (pj,') to a measure of unit cost, the utility-denominated value of labor (fhJ 
divided by productivity (a,). 
However, the other conditions reflect the implementation constraint's effect 
on the restricted social planner's behavior. Comparing these first-order condi- 
tions to the analogues from the decentralized formulation of  the model pro- 
vides some insight into the optimal policy problem. First, however, it is neces- 
sary to say a word about +,.  The multiplier  is the shadow value of decreasing 
a price-setting firm's  marginal present discounted profits with respect to rela- 
tive price. Because the planner would like firms to have positive marginal 
profits, the multiplier is negative.23  For consumption and labor, the individual's 
first-order conditions were 
As in section 8.2 above, h,  is the shadow value of a unit of consumption to the 
individual, whereas A, is the value the planner attaches to a marginal unit of 
consumption. In a competitive economy these objects are identical. With mo- 
nopolistic competition, the planner values the marginal unit of  consumption 
more than an individual does because higher aggregate consumption alleviates 
the monopoly pricing constraint (28).  A marginal unit of labor input has a similar 
23. Note that the second set of  terms in eq. (30),  which is written there as 
can alternatively be written as 
(36) 
zero is the "bound' on marginal profits, and -+ is the value of relaxing that bound. 
-C  P'+,[o - x(c0,,c,,n,,a,)  - px(c  ,,+,  3c,+,3n,+,,af+i)~; 
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effect (a,  > -du(c,,  n,, a,)ldn,) because labor supply dictates that higher labor 
input corresponds to a higher real wage and hence a lower markup. 
The first-order conditions for cj do not have  as simple an analogue in the 
decentralized problem, but they can be easily understood as describing how 
the policymaker equates appropriately defined marginal rates of  substitution 
and transformation between co and c,. Rewriting equation (32) as 
The left-hand side is the policymaker’s marginal rate of  substitution between 
c0,,  and c~,,;  it describes how much c0,,  the policymaker would forgo to gain a 
marginal increase in c,,,. The decrease in c0,, has two effects. First, it mechani- 
cally decreases the index of consumption, and marginal consumption is valued 
at A,. Second, it affects marginal profits (dx(c,,,,  c,, n,, ~,)/dc~,,),  and marginal 
marginal profits are valued at +,. Increasing cl,,  has similar effects, except that 
the change in marginal profits is valued with last period’s multiplier, reflecting 
the importance of firms who set their prices in that period. Under commitment, 
the policymaker takes into account the effect current-period policy  actions 
have on previous-period decisions. The right-hand side of equation (39) is the 
marginal rate of transformation between co,,  and c~.~;  it describes how much cl,, 
could be produced using the resources freed up by  a marginal decrease in the 
production of c0,,. 
8.5.4 
We  are interested in optimal allocations that arise when the policy authority 
can fully commit to follow through on a plan that is optimal, that is, the solu- 
tion to a maximization problem such as that discussed above. This focus raises 
a set of interrelated conceptual and technical issues. 
Technically, an unusual aspect of the restricted social planning problem is 
that  there  is  a forward-looking constraint  (28), as  in  Aiyagari  and  Braun 
(1997). This is reflected in the form of the efficiency conditions (33) and (34) 
for choices at date t, which involve the lagged multiplier  Intuitively, the 
presence of  this lagged multiplier originates from the fact that for any date 
t > 0, a change in c, affects the pricing decision of  firms in period t - 1. In 
fact, we  can rewrite the implementation constraint terms in the Lagrangian 
as follows, 
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This rewriting stresses that there is an asymmetry attached to the initial start- 
up period. Above, we eliminated this asymmetry by including a lagged multi- 
plier, so that the first term on the right-hand side of equation (40) is implicitly 
written  as  +,x(c,.,,  c,, n,, a,) + +,-lx(cl,,,  c,,  IZ,, a,) for  t  = 0.  Including  the 
lagged multiplier yields a time-invariant system. Time invariance is desirable 
from a computational point of view, since it allows us to employ standard fixed- 
coefficient linear rational expectations solution methods to calculate the solu- 
tion to the restricted social planning problem. 
Conceptually, if the policy authority is free to reformulate its optimal plan 
on a period-by-period basis, then there is a problem of time inconsistency of 
optimal plans as in Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). 
It is then not sensible to formulate the optimal policy problem as we have, 
which is based on the assumption that the monetary  authority can choose a 
sequence of binding actions for every period. Our implicit assumption is that 
the policy authority is required to commit to a state-contingent plan in period 
zero and follow it in all subsequent periods. Following Kydland and Prescott 
(1980), we view the introduction of the artificial multiplier as a device corre- 
sponding to the focus of our investigation: we want to consider the behavior of 
an economy after the effects of an initial “start-up” period have worn away. 
That is, we are looking at a stochastic steady state in which a monetary author- 
ity has long been following an optimal monetary policy. We can calculate the 
effect of an initial start-up period by setting the lagged multiplier  to zero 
and studying the resulting paths of  economic activity from this initial condi- 
tion. Computing the magnitude of welfare in this situation, relative to one that 
starts with  equal to its steady state value, provides a measure of the tempta- 
tion for a policymaker to renege on a previously chosen plan. 
We  divide our discussion of optimal monetary policy into two questions. 
First, what pattern of real quantities should the monetary authority pick as its 
long-run objective and what does this imply about the optimal rate of inflation? 
Second, how should quantities vary in response to productivity  shocks and 
what does this imply about the relationship of nominal variables to the busi- 
ness cycle? 
8.6  A Monetary Modified Golden Rule 
In section 8.3, we noted that relative price distortions are minimized at zero 
inflation, and the smallest average markup is achieved at a low but positive 
inflation rate. Not surprisingly, then, the highest steady state flow of-momen- 
tary utility is achieved at a low but positive inflation rate, defined as n in sub- 378  Robert G. King and Alexander L. Wolman 
section 8.3.1. However, this low but positive inflation rate is not the optimal 
policy  in steady state. Instead, the steady state of  the solution to the opti- 
mal policy problem is zero inflation.  The distinction between these two optimal 
policy problems is subtle but important: if  the monetary  authority is con- 
strained to choosing a constant inflation rate, it would choose n,  but if uncon- 
strained, it would choose a path that ended in a steady state of zero inflation. 
Henceforth, we will refer to this surprising result as a modified monetary 
golden rule. We  now substantiate it by  examining the constraints and first- 
order conditions, and showing that optimal policy mandates co,, = c,,, = ct, 
which is only consistent with equilibrium under zero inflation. It is straightfor- 
ward to impose a steady state on equations (25)-(28)  and thereby show that it 
is feasible for a steady state to have c,,, = c,., = c,  and xj,,  = 0 for allj. To show 
that this is also desirable for the social planner, we must examine the first-order 
conditions. The crucial condition is (39), repeated here in its steady state form: 
where variables without time subscripts denote steady state values. 
To determine whether it is desirable for the steady state to have co = c, = c, 
we  need to know whether equation (41) is satisfied by  these values. As dis- 
cussed previously, the right-hand side of this expression is always unity since 
the utility cost of producing each good is identical: po = p, = R/a. The symme- 
try  of  the aggregator function implies that  dc(co,  c,)/dc,  = dc(c,, c,)/dc, = 
1/2. Further, the effect of consumption associated with today's price setters on 
today's  implementation constraint, dx(c,, c,  n,  a)ldc,,  is just the same as the 
effect of consumption associated with yesterday's price setters on yesterday's 
implementation constraint, dx(c,, c, n,  a)/&,. Hence, the left-hand side is also 
equal to unity when c, = c, = c. Imposing c, = c, = c on equations (31)-(34) 
in steady state then implies unique values for the key endogenous variables. 
This result may seem very special, but it can be shown to generalize to many 
other related environments, including models with multiperiod price setting 
and with randomly timed adjustments by individual firms of a very rich form 
(as in Calvo 1983; Levin 1991). Rather than pursue these extensions, we con- 
centrate on the intuition behind this general result in the simple case at hand. 
As the title of this section suggests, there is an analogy between the subopti- 
mality of  fi and the suboptimality of the golden rule in growth models. It is 
suboptimal to maintain a capital stock corresponding to the highest sustainable 
constant consumption in the one-sector growth model because, in the transition 
to a lower capital stock, consumption and hence utility can be increased. Even- 
tually, at the modified golden rule steady state, consumption will be lower into 379  What Should the Monetary Authority Do When Prices Are Sticky? 
the infinite future. But the fact that future utility is discounted makes it optimal 
to move from the golden rule to the modified golden rule. In our model, it is 
suboptimal to maintain fi, the constant inflation rate that yields highest wel- 
fare, because, in the transition to a lower inflation rate, consumption and hence 
utility can be increased. Eventually, and in particular in the new steady state, 
the markup will be higher and consumption and utility lower, but in the early 
stages of  the transition,  utility  is higher. The fact that future utility  is dis- 
counted makes it optimal to undertake this transition. 
One perspective on the optimality of zero inflation comes from looking back 
at figure 8.6, which shows the expansionary effect of an anticipated disinfla- 
tion. Given that the steady state solution has zero inflation and that solution is 
saddle-path stable, it must be that if a policymaker wakes up in a world with 
low but positive inflation, it is optimal to disinflate. Figure 8.6 shows exactly 
this pattern: a disinflation that is announced in advance generates increases in 
period utility for several periods, followed in the long run by a decrease. The 
benefit of the transition comes because it involves a lower markup; adjusting 
firms lower their relative  prices in anticipation  of  the slowdown in money 
growth. With a lower markup, the real wage is higher and consumption and 
utility are higher, given that productivity is unchanged.24 
The above argument is straightforward in implying that optimal policy has 
a steady state with lower inflation than fi, but by itself it leaves unanswered 
the following interrelated questions. First, what is it about zero inflation that 
makes  the  argument  for  an  announced  disinflation  invalid  once  zero  is 
reached? Second, how can it be that the specific optimality of zero inflation 
does not depend on parameter values, in particular the discount factor? Zero 
inflation is special in that it involves elimination of the relative price distortion. 
By reducing inflation toward zero, the monetary authority earns a benefit from 
bringing relative prices into line. By further reducing inflation, the monetary 
authority incurs a cost in terms of relative price distortions. 
As for the invariance of the zero inflation result under changes in the dis- 
count factor, the missing link in this puzzle is that fi  itself depends on p. From 
equation (23),  one can show that fI converges to unity from above as p con- 
verges to unity from  If p is high, there is little incentive to announce 
a disinflation because the long-run increase in the markup-and  corresponding 
decrease in welfare-is  not discounted very much. However, high p also im- 
plies that fi is close to unity, so the disinflation consistent with optimal policy 
24. Of course the figure is generated using particular parameters. The result that zero inflation 
is the steady state of the solution to the optimal policy problem does not depend on parameters 
within the class of models we consider. 
25. From eq. (23),  the constant gross inflation rate that minimizes the markup converges to unity 
with the discount factor. Because unity is also the inflation rate that eli*pinates the relative price 
distortion, it follows that II converges to unity with the discount factor (n  is always between unity 
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is very small. In contrast, if the discount factor is low, optimal policy involves 
a larger disinflation in the long run (fi is higher), but the long run is discounted 
more heavily. 
Thus far our explanation of  the zero-inflation result has been focused on 
why it would be optimal to disinflate to get to zero inflation. Earlier, however, 
we showed that positive monetary shocks were expansionary, which suggests 
that the monetary authority would actually choose to leave an initial steady 
state of price stability for positive inflation. This is incorrect because in steady 
state any inflation is expected. Accordingly, the planner who wants to have an 
expansion at t must pay for it at t -  1 in terms of effects on the implementation 
constraint, which is sufficiently costly that he chooses to forgo his leverage on 
the average markup. 
8.7  Optimal Stabilization Policy 
We now turn our attention to describing the behavior of real economic activ- 
ity under optimal stabilization policy, specifically the response of  economic 
activity to productivity disturbances. With a steady state that equates consump- 
tion across firms of different types (as would occur under price stability), we 
can analyze optimal stabilization policy by log-linearizing the system of equa- 
tions (25)-(28) and (31)-(34)  in the neighborhood of  this steady state. The 
resulting linear system is described fully in appendix B. It is straightforward 
to use that linear system to analyze the optimal response of real quantities to a 
productivity shock. That optimal response turns out to involve equality of  all 
relative prices, which translates into zero inflation just as in steady state. In 
what follows, we describe how to show this result and discuss the mechanics 
of how monetary policy can achieve it. 
8.7.1 
As one might expect, an important equation for understanding optimal pol- 
icy is the optimal pricing equation or, equivalently, the implementation con- 
straint (28). In its linearized form, that equation is 
Real Dynamics under Optimal Policy 
and the linearized x functions are given by26 
+  yrOXcnY(dn,/n),  forj =  0,  1. 
26. Note that there are extra terms involving deviations in c and h which vanish because they 
are multiplied by  zero, the steady state value of x: at the steady state, adjusting and nonadjusting 
firms charge the same price, and it is the price that sets “marginal profits” equal to zero period 
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If  a productivity shock is not to optimally induce price variation, it must not 
cause marginal profits to deviate from zero for adjusters or nonadjusters. Re- 
femng to equation (42), this would mean holding xj at zero (so dxj = 0) and 
holding cj = c. For these requirements to be mutually consistent, it must be 
that labor input does not respond to the shock. For the preferences in equation 
(2), it is in fact the case that labor input will not respond to productivity shocks 
as long as the markup does not respond (see eq. [9], and recall that the markup 
is a,/w,).  And from equation (19), an unchanged constant markup (=  1/+,)  is 
consistent with adjusting firms not changing their relative prices if  the price 
level is constant (under these conditions the numerator and denominator of eq. 
[  191 cancel once real marginal cost is factored out of the numerator). 
So far this line of reasoning does not prove that a constant price level is part 
of the optimal response to a productivity shock, but it does suggest a construc- 
tive method of  proof. First, conjecture zero response of labor input, and re- 
sponses of c, and c,,~ exactly equal to the change in productivity. Next refer to 
equation (39); if symmetry with respect to co and c,  is maintained, as it will be 
according to the conjecture, then it must be that +r  = I$-, = $. Expand the 
conjecture, then, to include zero response of +,. Confirming that the conjecture 
is correct requires some tedious algebra that we will not reproduce, but concep- 
tually it is straightforward. Simply impose the conjecture on the linearized 
equations in appendix B, and verify that those equations are satisfied. They are. 
In response to a productivity shock, then, the monetary  authority should 
accommodate so that the price level is unchanged and firms continue to max- 
imize profits on a period-by-period basis. Figure 8.8 displays impulse response 
functions under optimal monetary policy for a serially correlated (p = 0.9), 
positive productivity shock. Those responses are identical to what would be 
found in a real business cycle model. With the price level constant, the nominal 
interest rate behaves identically to the real interest rate. Because it essentially 
tracks expected consumption growth, the real interest rate falls initially and 
then gradually rises back to its steady state level. 
We  have thus verified that the constant inflation, constant markup policy 
conjectured to be optimal by Goodfriend and King (1997) and King and Wol- 
man (1996) is in fact optimal. However, the fact that there are no money de- 
mand distortions in the current framework implies that zero inflation is opti- 
mal. Our demonstration of the desirability of  a constant price level proceeds 
differently from that of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) in that we do not 
assume that a combined fiscal and monetary authority has overcome the under- 
lying monopolistic competition distortions in the economy. 
8.7.2  Optimal Monetary Policy 
Because the real effects of monetary policy work through relative prices in 
this model, they can be interpreted as working through relative quantities. In 
fact, it is possible to fully describe the real outcomes under optimal monetary 
policy without any discussion of nominal variables, although we chose not to 382  Robert G. King and Alexander L. Wolman 
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Note: For axis units, see note to fig. 8.4. 
Persistent productivity shock with optimal policy response 
pursue this expository strategy in the previous subsection. In practice, how- 
ever, monetary policy operates through nominal variables such as the nominal 
interest rate, the money stock, and the price level. This subsection details how 
to reinterpret optimal policy in terms of the nominal variables that would pro- 
duce our optimal allocations in (monopolistically competitive) general equi- 
librium. 
The state variables of the model include prices set by firms in previous peri- 
ods, which are relevant since these firms are unable to change their prices. In 
the two-period case, the only relevant historical information is P,,r  = Po,,-,. 
The real policy  problem provides optimal quantities at date  t, c0,,  and  c1,*. 
“Decentralizing” this optimal policy requires that the relative nominal prices 
satisfy 
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Since PI,,  is predetermined, equation (43) implies a unique level of Po,,  and 
thus the price level is uniquely determined under optimal policy by equation 
(5),  as PI =  + %PJ;E)l’(l--E).  Given the price index and the level of real 
activity, equation (10) dictates that the quantity of money must be 
MI  =  ktc,. 
The real interest rate must satisfy the real Fisher equation (1 l),  which links it 
to the marginal utility of consumption, 
and the nominal interest rate must satisfy equation (12), 
so that we can also determine the relevant interest rates under optimal policy. 
Combining these equations with the result that P, =  we find that the real 
interest rate r, is equal to the nominal interest rate R,. 
Since there is a predetermined price level from the previous period, PI-,, 
and it is optimal to maintain that price level in the current period, there is a 
simpler way  to provide a monetary interpretation of  optimal policy. With all 
real variables determined by the solution to the real policy problem, the money 
supply is then given from equation (10) as 
MI  =  kI--,cf. 
In this setting, as in the more general case, the fact that yesterday’s price level 
is an observable, predetermined variable provides the anchor needed to pro- 
duce determinacy. 
8.7.3  Extensions to Multiperiod Price Setting 
Our analysis has focused on the two-period case of Taylor-style staggering 
for concreteness. However, it is easy to extend the analysis of optimal policy 
in two directions. First, one can determine an optimal policy for multiperiod 
price setting with two minor modifications of the approach that we developed 
above: it is necessary to (1) modify the implementation constraint to 0 = El 
constraints on real quantities at date t of the form (c~,~/c~.~)-~’~  = 
An important consequence of these modifications is that more lags of the mul- 
tiplier + are added to the dynamic system. Second, we can incorporate ran- 
domly timed adjustments by individual firms of a very rich form (as in Levin’s 
1991 extension of the Calvo 1983 framework). In this case the distribution of 
C,=,  J-I P  I x(c,,,+,, c,+~,  n,+,, uf+])  in the J-period  case and (2)  introduce additional 
27. We provide an example of this structure in section 8.8 below. 384  Robert G. King and Alexander L. Wolman 
firms would no longer be uniform with respect to time since last price adjust- 
ment, and consequently the implementation constraint would have unequal 
(declining) weights on x~,~+~,  j  = 0,  1, . . . ,  J -  1. 
8.8  Temptations for the Monetary Authority 
While we have demonstrated that a policy of pegging the price level is opti- 
mal under commitment, there are temptations for the monetary authority to 
deviate from this plan. In this section, we provide two examples of how this 
temptation might arise and quantify its magnitude. 
8.8.1  Starting Up 
The most basic temptation is that associated with “starting up” the policy of 
pegging the price level. For example, if a rule like the Mack bill were adopted, 
one option would be for Congress to allow the Federal Reserve System two 
years to choose a price level that it would peg, perhaps so that it could get 
appropriate policy procedures in place. 
In our model economy, this would correspond to an optimal monetary policy 
problem with  the initial multiplier +,,  set equal to zero; all lagged product 
prices and quantities would be given by history, but since optimal policy under 
commitment was not followed in the past, the lagged multiplier would not be 
given by  history. (Technically, it would then be appropriate for the monetary 
authority to ignore the lagged multiplier, that is, set it to zero.) The results of 
simulating optimal policy in this setting are shown in figure 8.9 for a model 
with four-quarter price setting.28 
In the initial period, the money stock more than doubles, and with a majority 
of prices fixed, this yields a huge increase in output (almost as large as the 
increase in the money stock). There is a jump in the price level, and the corre- 
sponding high inflation rate is maintained for the four quarters until all firms 
have had the opportunity to adjust their prices. In this transitional period the 
money supply is decreasing, however. Nominal interest rates are low during 
the transition; this is reconciled with the high expected inflation through antici- 
pated decreases in consumption. In terms of the representative agent’s prefer- 
ences, the transition yields the equivalent of a 1.6 percent per year permanent 
increase in consumption. In other words, the temptation for the monetary au- 
thority to ignore +o  in any period would be large. The fact that the model is 
parameterized with a high labor supply elasticity and a high markup is directly 
responsible for the size of the temptation; the higher the labor supply elasticity, 
the greater the consequences of  a given markup. With this parameterization, 
steady state output is far below what it would be with perfect competition, so 
28. In the four-quarter price-setting case, there are three lagged multipliers that must be set to 
zero. As described in subsection 8.7.3, when prices may be fixed for more than two periods, lagged 
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Exploiting initial conditions with four-quarter  staggering 
the monetary authority can generate large movements in output on a tempo- 
rary basis. 
8.8.2  An Unusual Shock 
In section 8.7, we  assumed that the monetary authority had to determine 
how it would respond to shocks before they occurred. This assumption was at 
the heart of our analysis of how monetary policy should respond to a productiv- 
ity shock: we were interested in how the monetary authority should respond as 
part  of  a policy. An alternative is to determine how the monetary authority 
should respond to a shock that is unusual, in the sense that it is unexpected and 
viewed as never to recur. In this case, the monetary authority should exploit 











c. markup (0) 








-16  ' 
0246810 












-  15000 
-17000 
246810 
d. inflation (0) 
and nominal rate (x) 
I 
I 
0  2  4  6  8  10 
Fig. 8.10  Exploiting initial conditions in the face of a productivity shock 
Note: For axis units, see note to fig. 8.4. 
The results are shown in figure 8.10. A productivity shock is now accompa- 
nied by  a burst of  inflation, and in fact the inflationary response associated 
with  +o  = 0 dominates the response associated with the productivity shock. 
Another way of seeing this point is to look across some prior figures: the re- 
sponse to an unusual shock in figure 8.10 looks much more like the figure 8.9 
case of starting up, where the only deviation from steady state initial conditions 
is in 4,,,  than it looks like the optimal policy response in figure 8.7, where the 
only deviation from steady state initial conditions is in the productivity shock. 
How are we to interpret these temptations to deviate from optimal policy 
under commitment? To begin, the fact that the temptations are so large hinges 
on the magnitude of the economy's existing distortions. To  the extent that our 
parameterization of those distortions is proxying for other features of actual 387  What Should the Monetary Authority Do When  Prices Are Sticky? 
economies, one would want to better understand those other features before 
passing final judgment on the size of the temptations. Conditional on the large 
temptation being accurate, a natural interpretation is that it points to the need 
for some commitment device, with an act of Congress being a natural example. 
Without a commitment device, one is led to consider whether optimal policy 
under commitment can be sustained through reputation effects or trigger strat- 
egies. Ireland (1997) has investigated this issue in a sticky price model where 
optimal policy can be sustained through reputation; whether our model admits 
such equilibria is an open question. 
8.9  Interest Rate Rules and Economic Activity 
In contrast to other chapters in this volume, our work has concentrated on 
determining optimal monetary policy  rather  than on  making  comparisons 
across alternative monetary policy rules, with some specific emphasis on inter- 
est rate rules following Taylor (1993). In this section, we discuss two aspects 
of interest rate rules and macroeconomic activity, suggesting how our analysis 
could be extended to bring it more into line with the other research reported in 
this volume. 
8.9.1  An Optimal Interest Rate Rule 
Our characterization of optimal monetary policy implies that there should 
be zero inflation, so that nominal and real interest rates are identical. Optimal 
monetary policy therefore can be implemented through an interest rate rule of 
the form 
where r:  is the real interest rate determined by  the real Fisher equation (11) 
and the optimal quantity response. As with the interest rate rule that we used 
to study the response of the economy to interest rate shocks (24), the optimal 
interest rate rule (44) also involves a positive response of the nominal rate to 
deviations of the price level from its target. This response assures that there is 
a determinate price level under optimal policy but otherwise is unimportant 
since with R, = r:  it follows thatf.(ln P, -  In p)  = 0. 
Implementing optimal policy, however, requires knowing how the underly- 
ing real interest rate-the  real interest rate that would obtain if  prices were 
flexible-responds  to shocks. To illustrate that this is a nontrivial problem for 
a monetary authority, figure 8.11 shows the response of  the real interest rate 
under three different assumptions about the productivity process. The first is 
the first-order scheme for which we described optimal policy in figure 8.8; the 
second makes productivity a second-order autoregression, In a, = 1.3 In  a,-, 
-  0.4 In  + e,; and the third assumes that productivity is difference station- 
ary, In  a, = 1.3 In a,-, -  0.3 In  a,-*  + e,. All of  these specifications can be a. AR(1) productivity shock 
5, 
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captured as special cases of the second-order stochastic difference equation In 
a, = 5,  In a,-, -  5, In a,-,  + e,. 
Our model economy is very simple: there is no investment and labor does 
not respond to productivity shocks under the optimal allocation, so output and 
consumption track productivity perfectly. This simplicity also means that the 
real interest rate approximately tracks the expected growth rate of  produc- 
ti~ity,,~ 
Under our basic specification, productivity (and hence output) is a stationary 
first-order autoregression, so the real interest rate depends negatively on the 
level of  output (5, - 1 < 0 and <,  = 0 imply that r:  = (5, - 1) In a,). By 
contrast, under our third specification, there is no connection between the level 
of the real interest rate and the level of output: productivity growth is a station- 
ary first-order autoregression (<, = 1.3 and <,  = 0.3) so that the real interest 
rate rises when output growth is unexpectedly strong, r:  = 0.3 (In a, -  In q-,). 
Finally, the second specification combines an initial period of positive growth 
effects with a subsequent period of negative growth effects, and thus aspects 
of each of the other specifications. 
From the standpoint of a central bank using an interest rate instrument, the 
difficulty is that optimal policy requires knowledge of the structure of the econ- 
omy if there is a single type of productivity shock and of the type of shock that 
is currently occurring if there are multiple shocks. 
8.9.2  Comparison of Alternative Rules 
To compare alternative monetary policy rules with the optimal rule that we 
have discussed, it is necessary to take a stand on the details of the structure of 
the economy, including the internal mechanisms and forcing processes. Then 
one can calculate the stationary level of lifetime utility (1) under the optimal 
and alternative rules.30  As the analysis of Rotemberg and Woodford in chapter 
2 of this volume indicates, the results of policy analysis along these lines de- 
pend importantly on the particular structure of the economy; we do not pursue 
such analysis here because we are not yet willing to take a stand on the details 
of that structure. 
29. This expression is exact under optimal monetary policy, since this makes employment con- 
stant and the marginal utility of consumption is then 
It would be exact under all policies if the preference specification were u = In c -  0n'+Y. 
look at policies in terms of their effect on the stationary level of momentary utility (1). 
30. This approach is similar to that of Rotemberg and  Woodford (chap. 2 of this volume), who 390  Robert G. King and Alexander L. Wolman 
8.10  Conclusions 
This chapter provides a basic example of the analysis of optimal monetary 
policy in an environment with imperfect competition and sticky prices. The 
general approach resembles that traditional in public finance rather than practi- 
cal macroeconomics. That is: we derive optimal policy by maximizing the wel- 
fare of the economy’s representative agent, subject to resource constraints and 
an additional condition that summarizes the implications of imperfect compe- 
tition and sticky prices for what the monetary authority can feasibly select. We 
show that a policy of stabilizing the price level is optimal in two respects. First, 
the average rate of inflation should be zero. Second, the price level should not 
vary with the business cycle. 
While this result was obtained in a very  simple economy, the methods ap- 
plied in this paper are capable of extending the analysis of  monetary policy 
well beyond settings in which there is a single shock (to productivity), strong 
assumptions about preferences (implying constant demand elasticities and zero 
optimal labor response to productivity shocks), a single factor of production 
(labor), a single location of real distortions (imperfect competition in the com- 
modity market), and complete information about underlying shocks. We  thus 
outline some directions in which it is important for this research to be ex- 
tended. 
Multiple Shocks. Within the simple model without capital, there are two impor- 
tant directions of extensions. First, one would like to understand how the econ- 
omy responds to “aggregate demand’ shocks, such as changes in government 
demand for final output and exogenous changes in the timing of consumption 
decisions by  households. We  have undertaken these extensions and find that 
the policy of smoothing the price level continues to be optimal. Second, it is 
important to think about the effects of energy shocks. One direct interpretation 
is that these are productivity shocks, in which case we already have the answer. 
But an alternative approach would be to add energy as an input to final con- 
sumption that was in exogenous supply and was sold by flexible price firms. 
One would no longer expect that optimal monetary policy would smooth all 
measures of  the price level (in particular, not the final consumption deflator) 
but rather an index corresponding to the prices of  imperfectly competitive 
sticky price firms. 
Alternative  Preference  Specijkations.  Our  example  economy incorporated 
strong-constant  elasticity utility-assumptions  about the preferences of indi- 
viduals for differentiated products and for the trade-off between consumption 
and leisure. Public finance theory teaches us that the exact optimality of tax 
equalization (across products) or tax smoothing (over time) typically requires 
constant elasticities. Our general analytical approach does not require this set 391  What Should the Monetary Authority Do When  Prices Are Sticky? 
of  assumptions, which we used because they are simple and conventional in 
the literature. It would be useful to explore how alternative preference specifi- 
cations would alter our conclusions about the optimal rate of inflation and the 
optimal cyclical variation in the price level. 
Richer Production Structure. In our view, a successful positive model of  the 
business cycle requires the endogenous determination of investment and ca- 
pacity utilization. Thus it is important to determine the nature of optimal mone- 
tary policy when the production structure is enriched along these lines. 
Richer  Pricing  Structure.  Our  analysis has  concentrated entirely on  time- 
dependent pricing. It would be useful to extend the analysis to state-dependent 
pricing, and it seems feasible to use the framework of Dotsey, King, and Wol- 
man (forthcoming) for this purpose. 
Additional Sources of Distortions. Many economists believe that the labor mar- 
ket does not clear in the way  that we have specified in this chapter, but that 
(1) there is market power on the part of  firms and workers, or (2) there are 
incentive problems arising from incomplete information about worker charac- 
teristics or effort. For example, Romer (1993) argues that additional “real ri- 
gidities” along these lines are a necessary ingredient of a successful business 
cycle theory, with implications for the nature of optimal monetary policy. The 
general approach developed in our research appears capable of handling exten- 
sions to additional distortions, say along efficiency wage lines, which would 
introduce another implementation constraint into the real policy problem. Ex- 
ploring the implications of these frictions for optimal monetary policy seems 
feasible and fascinating. 
Incomplete Information. Our analysis is conducted under the assumption that 
the monetary authority has full current information about the shocks that are 
impinging on the economy. McCallum (1  997) has stressed that monetary pol- 
icy rules should be operational, in the sense of  respecting the informational 
constraints on the monetary authority. It is important to extend our analysis to 
situations of incomplete information, and we believe that it is feasible to do so. 
More General Specijcation of Policy. We have restricted the monetary author- 
ity to following deterministic rules. However, it may be optimal to employ a 
randomized rule because of the presence of  distortions (technically, the form 
of the implementation constraint). For example, the monetary authority might 
choose a policy that randomly expanded the economy but was accompanied 
by a commitment to disinflate whenever expansions occ~rred.~’  Recent analy- 
3 1. The possible desirability of this sort of policy was suggested to us by Athanasios Orphanides. 392  Robert G. King and Alexander L. Wolman 
ses of optimal fiscal policies, such as that of Bassetto (1997), permit the policy 
authority to follow such randomized strategies and determine whether they are 
part of an optimal plan. 
This is a lengthy list of open topics, but in principle each topic can be analyzed 
with the same basic approach used in the current paper. That approach uses 
standard tools of  public finance to analyze optimal policy in what have now 
become standard models of monopolistic competition and sticky prices. 
Appendix A 
The Household 5. Choice Problem 
This appendix provides more detail on the households dynamic choice prob- 
lem for aggregate consumption and labor supply that leads to equations (7) 
and (8). We  also use this appendix to sketch out the incorporation of  a “shop- 
ping time” approach to money demand along the lines of  King and Wolman 
( 1996), when there is interest-bearing money. The households optimization 
problem can be written in dynamic programming form as 
v(m,-,  ,  b,-]>  S,-l’ a,)  =  (Ct,nff?;%,,b, ,(u(c,,n,,  a,) +  PWm,,  b,,  S,? ~,+,lU”  9 
where the relevant aggregate state variables at date t are u,. (We write condi- 
tional  expectations  such  as  E{v(m,, b,, s,,  u,+l)lu,} more  compactly  as 
E,v(m,, b,, s,, u,+J  below.) The maximization takes place subject to the budget 
constraint (6),  which we write as 
c, +  m, +  V,S, +  b, +  w,h(m,/c,) = 
z,s,-,  +  v,s1-1 +  w,nr + (1 +  R!I)(e-I/e)m,  + (1 +  ~,-1)(eL/e)b[-l. 
In these expressions, m, = M,/P,  is current real balances, b, = B,/P,  is current 
real bonds, and h(m,/c,)  is the amount of  time spent in transactions activity. 
Forming a Lagrangian 
L, =  {~(C,>~,>~,)  +  PE,v(m,,b,,s,,~,+,)~ 
+  h,[Z,s,-l +  vts,-, +  w,n, + (1 +  q!I)(e-,/mmt-l 
+ (1 +  ~,-l)(~-,/<)bl-l  - c, - m, - vp,  - b, - w,c,h(m,/c,)l, 
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where the final equalities on the right-hand sides of the final three equations 
arise from standard “envelope theorem” arguments, such as those found in 
Stokey and Lucas (1989). 
These five conditions have the following interpretations. The first two condi- 
tions are requirements for efficient consumption and labor supply. The third is 
the requirement for efficient holdings of real money balances, that is, the mod- 
el’s implicit money demand function. The fourth is the efficiency condition for 
holding of nominal bonds, that is, the nominal Fisher equation in the text. The 
fifth is the efficiency condition for holding risky assets, such as the equities in 
our model. 
The nature of the real demand for money implicit in these equations can be 
highlighted by combining the third and fourth equations to yield 
We now turn to thinking about the limiting form of these equations that obtains 
when RY  approaches R,; that is, the real cost of  holding money goes to zero. 
Then the demand for money approaches 
m,  =  kc,, 
where k is a constant such that h’(k) = 0, which represents the satiation level 
of real cash balances. 
Appendix B 
Linearized Equations  for Optimal Policy 
This appendix contains the linearized equations of the model with optimal pol- 
icy. For convenience we first reproduce the optimal policy problem. Then we 394  Robert G. King and Alexander L. Wolman 
list the first-order conditions in their true and linearized forms. In the linearized 
equations, it  denotes the percentage deviation of  s  from its steady state value, 
whereas ds, denotes the level deviation from steady state. Unsubscripted en- 
dogenous variables denote steady state values. 
The Lagrangian for the optimal policy problem is 
The first-order  conditions are as follows: for labor input at firms with prices 
set in periods t and t -  1 
(B2)  J,Ial  - O.SClr)  0  =  ~  =  PJ(p  forj =  0, 1, 
aL 
an,.  I 
033)  0  =  6, +  - In,  forj =  0, 1; 
for consumption of goods with prices set in periods t and t -  1 
forj =  0,  1, 
for the consumption index 395  What Should the Monetary Authority Do When Prices Are Sticky? 
and for total labor input 
The constraints involve technology, 
(B 10)  c,,,  =  a,n,,,  forj =  0,  1, 
(B11)  0  =  t,,,  - ii, - GI; 
the consumption aggregator, 
and optimal price setting 
(B 16) 
(B  17)  0  =  dxo,, +  P '  dx,,,,,  ' 
.4co,t>cr>~r3ar)  +  PX(CI,,+l,C,+,'nl+,,a,+,)  =  0, 
In these equations, x(ci,,,  c,, n,, a3 is the change in period I profits associated 
with a marginal price change in period t -  i, assuming that the nominal price 
chosen in period t -  i is in effect in period t: 396  Robert G. King and Alexander L. Wolman 
(Bl8)  x(c,,,,c,,n,,a,)  E Arc, 
(B19)  dx,,,  =  h[(l - ~)(1  - 1/~)  +  EO~Y](~;,,  - t,)  +  Acy~On~ii,; 
and X,  is the marginal utility of consumption: 
The above linearizations make use of  the facts that in steady state, ax(.)/ 
da = 0 and dc(*)/dc, = 0.5. 
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Comment  Benjamin M. Friedman 
Robert King and Alexander Wolman have written a highly appropriate paper 
for a conference on monetary policy rules. Their paper usefully anchors, both 
methodologically and substantively, one end of the intellectual spectrum under 
debate here. King and Wolman argue rigorously for a rigorous rule of  price 
stability. Their paper is sharp and clear on both counts. The monetary policy 
rule that they find optimal in the model they present differs from many of the 
“rules” considered in other papers at this conference in that (1) it is a genuine 
rule, the effects of which center on credible commitment by the central bank, 
not merely an indicative guide or “rule of thumb,” and (2)  it focuses on stabili- 
zation of prices, to the exclusion of any direct concern for smoothing output, 
interest rates, or other variables. 
Moreover, the paper is forthright-comprehensively  so-about  the limita- 
tions inherent in the framework of analysis it deploys. As a result, a perfectly 
accurate response to many of my remarks as discussant would be “We know 
that, and in fact on page such and such we talked about that issue ourselves.” 
But while that response would be true, it would miss the point. Being forthright 
about a model’s  limitations does not render them without force. In my com- 
ments on the paper I shall first explain why I find the authors’ case for a price 
stability rule unpersuasive, then  discuss several features of  the underlying 
model that merit attention even though they do not bear centrally on the paper’s 
basic recommendation, and finally step aside from the paper as a whole to pose 
two somewhat more general questions about a price stability rule for mone- 
tary policy. 
Why the Paper’s Case for a Price Stability Rule Is Unpersuasive 
The analysis that King and Wolman carry out in this paper is impressive and 
serious. The model that they construct embodies many useful properties-not 
least an explicit recognition that prices are sticky and a real attempt to repre- 
sent, internally, the monopolistically competitive process that makes them SO. 
(The model also renders the inflation rate persistent.) Nevertheless, I do not 
recognize in their model the key features of the actual monetary policy envi- 
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ronment that lead me to believe that a strict price stability rule would be a poor 
way to conduct monetary policy. There are three main reasons. 
First, the central bank in the world of King and Wolman’s paper anticipates 
and understands all shocks. (In fact, King and Wolman consider only one kind 
of shock, a simultaneous shock to preferences and productivity, but that is an- 
other matter.) Much of  what makes monetary policy making hard, with or 
without a rule, is precisely that central bankers cannot know that a shock is 
coming in advance, and once it occurs they usually do not know just what kind 
of  shock it is. In the specific context of price stability, the hard questions that 
therefore arise are whether, and if  so, when and how, to return to a preestab- 
lished price path, once the economy is knocked off of it. Here that never hap- 
pens. Because policymakers can anticipate each shock, and act as it occurs, 
the aggregate price level never gets knocked off of its stable trajectory in the 
first place. 
Second, while prices in the King-Wolman model are sticky, nominal wages 
are not. As a result, when a productivity shock occurs, not only is there no 
impediment to reaching supply-equals-demand equilibrium in the labor mar- 
ket, but workers and firms can reach the market-clearing real wage with my 
price level that the central bank chooses to set. (In King and Wolman’s model 
the productivity shock that shifts labor demand also shifts labor supply in an 
exactly offsetting way, and so the quantity of labor input remains unaffected, 
but the real wage does have to move.) This structure is exactly the opposite of 
the more familiar story in which nominal wages are sticky, and part of the job 
of monetary policy is to use price level adjustment to move the real wage to- 
ward its postshock market-clearing value. King and Wolman take pains to ana- 
lyze carefully the real implications, in their monopolistic competition setting, 
of relative prices on different goods being out of line. By contrast, what seems 
to me an even more important relative price-the  real wage-is,  by  assump- 
tion, never out of line. 
Third, King and Wolman never explicitly show the value of commitment to 
the price stability rule they espouse. In a brief but much to the point section of 
the paper, they do show that “there are temptations for the monetary authority 
to deviate from this plan,” and that if  a shock arises that is “unexpected and 
viewed as never to recur,” the optimal one-shot response is “a burst of infla- 
tion” that raises output. But what is the cost of this departure from price stabil- 
ity? Barro and Gordon (1983), in their paper that did much to stimulate interest 
in commitment to a monetary policy rule, used a simple model of reputation 
effects to address this question. King and Wolman show that the temptation is 
large but then leave the matter at that. 
Further Peculiarities of the Model and Its Use 
In addition to the flexibility of money wages, the odd (but here rather harm- 
less) assumption that productivity shocks exactly mirror shocks to individuals’ 
labor-leisure preferences, and the absence of any shocks at all to either money 400  Robert G. King and Alexander L. Wolman 
demand or real aggregate demand, two further aspects of King and Wolman’s 
analysis merit specific comment. Neither is central to their principal argument, 
but in light of the focus of this conference each bears attention. 
First, the argument made here for a stable price path with zero inflation, as 
opposed  to  a  price  path  with  a  modest  upward  tilt,  amounts  to  turning 
Feldstein’s (1979) familiar argument on its head. In King and Wolman’s model, 
the long-run average inflation rate matters in two ways. Relative price distor- 
tions, which are strictly welfare reducing because they lead to suboptimal allo- 
cations among different consumption goods, are eliminated by  zero inflation. 
But the distortion due to firms’ average markup of price over production cost, 
which is also welfare reducing in that it depresses aggregate output, is mini- 
mized not at zero inflation but at an inflation rate that is small but positive. Not 
surprisingly, King and Wolman find that for reasonable parameter values the 
relative price distortion is quantitatively unimportant. Why, then, doesn’t the op- 
timal price trajectory slope upward at the rate that minimizes the welfare loss 
due to the markup? 
Their answer is a reverse Feldstein argument: Suppose that the economy is 
already at the markup-minimizing positive inflation rate. Because of the stag- 
gered price setting that underlies the stickiness of prices, a preannounced tran- 
sition to lower inflation-say,  zero-temporarily  raises  output. In the new 
state of zero inflation that prevails after the transition, the average markup is 
permanently higher, and therefore output and consumption are permanently 
lower. But, King and Wolman argue, the fact that this permanent reduction of 
output occurs only in the future, while the surge of  output associated with 
the transition happens immediately, means that expected utility, appropriately 
discounted over the infinite future, is enhanced. 
It is not clear how they can make this call without knowing the magnitudes 
of the temporary output increase and the permanent output reduction, the spe- 
cific discount rate, and so on. Most obviously, in the limit as the discount rate 
goes to zero, no temporary increase in output, no matter how large, can offset 
the utility-reducing effect of even a small permanent reduction of output there- 
after. Moreover, by  analogy with what Feldstein has argued, taking into ac- 
count that the larger permanent average markup and therefore the smaller per- 
manent average output will occur in a growing economy would further bias the 
answer toward simply keeping inflation at the positive rate that minimizes the 
markup. But at the least, a reader familiar with Feldstein’s (1979) paper will 
find the logic here familiar, albeit with the crucial signs reversed. Ironically, in 
King and Wolman’s setting, applying Feldstein’s logic with Feldsteink signs 
would mean that the King-Wolman model resembles the recent analysis by 
Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996) in providing an argument that a low but 
positive long-run inflation rate is preferable to zero in that it minimizes output- 
depressing distortions. 
One additional feature of King and Wolman’s analysis merits specific com- 
ment. Although they never write down a money demand function, or provide 401  What Should the Monetary Authority Do When Prices Are Sticky? 
much other detail about the nature of  asset markets in their model, they do 
assume that people must hold money to buy consumption goods and that the 
nonmoney asset is an equity security. They choose to disregard the familiar 
welfare loss associated with “triangles under the money demand function,” 
however, on the ground that nowadays most of what people use as money bears 
a “competitive return.” I certainly sympathize with the view that, at least at the 
inflation rates that seem relevant in most western industrialized countries to- 
day, the money demand triangles that over the years have been such an obses- 
sion in much of welfare theoretic analysis of monetary policy are uninteresting. 
But if the story here is not just that this matter is too small to bother with, 
but rather that money bears a “competitive return” in the sense that the return 
on money equals the return on the alternative asset, that leaves open the ques- 
tion of what determines how much money people hold. Because much of King 
and Wolman’s analysis of monetary policy begins with the central bank’s vary- 
ing money supply, presumably a well-behaved money demand, however de- 
rived, must in the end be integral to their story. 
Further Thoughts on a Stable Price Rule for Monetary Policy 
I shall conclude with two somewhat broader questions about the rationale 
and the design of a stable price rule for monetary policy. 
First, on the rationale: Does anybody still think time inconsistency is a prob- 
lem that needs solving in the monetary policy of the world‘s major economies? 
Two decades ago, when high and rising inflation rates stood out as the chief 
economic problem in the majority of industrialized countries, it was at least 
plausible-though  even then hardly a sure thing-to  suggest that this inflation 
was a consequence of a policy-making framework based on discretionary ac- 
tions by  the central bank. If so, then the gain from restricting that discretion 
was potentially large. But by now most industrialized countries have succeeded 
in slowing their inflation to very low levels, indeed approximately zero for 
practical purposes in some countries. More to the point, many countries, in- 
cluding in particular the United States, have  done so under formal policy- 
making institutions no different from what they had before. Even some of the 
countries that have introduced formal inflation targets (and that is not always 
the same as a genuine, committed policy rule) have done so only after achiev- 
ing the crucial turnaround in their inflation problems. 
This is not to say that the analysis of  time inconsistency by  Kydland and 
Prescott (1977),  Barro and Gordon (1983),  and others was logically wrong. 
But I believe it shows that it was wrong to conclude from that analysis that 
committing the central bank to a monetary policy rule was required to resolve 
the time-inconsistency problem. Maybe, as Barro and Gordon themselves sug- 
gested, the central bank’s own awareness of reputation effects has provided the 
solution. Perhaps, following Rogoff (19859, the appointment of “conservative” 
central bankers has been the answer. There remains much room for research 
and debate about how different industrialized countries have solved their re- 402  Robert G. King and Alexander L. Wolman 
spective inflation problems. But the fact remains that most have done so. Be- 
fore seriously considering committing monetary policy to a price stability rule, 
therefore-or,  for that matter, any other rule-we  ought at least to know what 
is the problem that commitment to a rule is supposed to solve. High inflation 
due to time inconsistency is no longer a satisfactory answer. 
Last, a question about the design of a price stability rule if there were to be 
one: I conjecture that, especially in the United States, there is a trade-off be- 
tween adhering to a genuine long-run price-targeting path, in the sense that 
bygones are not bygones and departures from the path are corrected (and in 
contrast to a strategy that accepts past mistakes and therefore under which the 
price level has infinite long-run variance), and aiming at a price path with zero 
slope. In other words, monetary policy can eliminate price level “base drift,” 
or it can aim at zero inflation, but it cannot do both. 
The reason is that, unlike in King and Wolman’s model, actual central banks 
cannot anticipate all disturbances, and so from time to time the actual price 
level will depart from whatever is the targeted trajectory. Some of those depar- 
tures will be on the low side, some on the high side. But whenever actual prices 
are above the targeted path, if  that path is horizontal then returning to it re- 
quires that prices fall absolutely. By  contrast, if the specified path is upward 
sloping-for  example, at 2.5 percent per annum as in the case of the Bank of 
England‘s target-returning  to it simply requires that for a while prices in- 
crease less rapidly than the path does, or perhaps even remain unchanged. 
Would the Federal Reserve, as a part of its publicly announced policy strat- 
egy, deliberately seek falling prices? Should it do so? Unless the answers to 
these questions are yes-and  I doubt that they are-then  the most that mone- 
tary policy can do with respect to prices and inflation is either aim at a hori- 
zontal price path but let bygones be bygones (especially on the upside), or hold 
to a long-run price path without base drift but do so for a path with upward 
slope. 
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Discussion Summary 
Frederic Mishkin strongly disagreed with Friedman and made three points on 
why time consistency might not work in the future. First, the Federal Reserve 
has an excellent chairman at the moment and an Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) that does understand policy. Second, the administration has been very 
supportive of the Federal Reserve, even when it raises interest rates. Third, the 
economy has had very favorable shocks, which means that the political pres- 
sure on the Federal Reserve has not been as severe as it could have been with 
less favorable supply shocks. Part of what has happened is that central banks 
have  dealt with  time inconsistency by  being more transparent, by  making 
themselves more accountable, and by being more explicit about numerical in- 
flation goals. Friedman replied that there was no disagreement since Mishkin 
just said that central banks are handling their problems on their own and do 
not need a rule to which to commit. Tom Surgent asked Friedman what he 
meant by “they are handling it on their own.” The paper is sharp in its definition 
of  the game that is being played. “Handling it on their own” sounds as if 
Friedman was predicting the same outcome from a different game, in which 
both sides choose sequentially. In this model, however, the outcome will not 
be the same and the appeal to reputation is not going to help for reasons iso- 
lated by Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1996). Bob Hull remarked that Kydland 
and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) are must-reads for central 
bankers everywhere in the world. Lars  Svensson also cautioned that these 
time-inconsistency issues should not be dismissed easily. Ten years ago, time- 
consistency issues were still very relevant in countries other than the United 
States. William Poole also noted that there was no inflation problem in 1963 
and many members of the profession ridiculed the Eisenhower administration’s 
1950s campaign against “creeping inflation.” Everything that Ben Friedman 
just said had already been said back in 1963. 
Svensson wondered about the absence of  any mechanism that would make 
it possible for the central bank to be committed to its rule. Robert King sug- 
gested that one answer to this question is that this might be a rule formulated 
outside the central bank, such as a law passed by U.S. Congress. Ben McCal- 
lum remarked that the discussion about the desirability of a monetary policy 
rule passed by Congress is tricky. McCallum’s view on this issue is that a rule, 
mandating inflation to be the Federal Reserve’s primary objective, passed by 
Congress, would make the Fed more independent. 
Michael Woodford noted that in his paper with Rotemberg the first best solu- 
tion also involves complete price stability. Achieving that first best may involve 
driving the nominal interest negative, which leads to a trade-off between price 
level and interest rate stabilization in order to have low average inflation con- 
sistent with  the zero nominal interest rate bound. In this framework, some 
kinds of  real shocks to aggregate demand can be easily added to the model 
without changing the results, such as government spending shocks, stochastic 404  Robert G. King and Alexander L. Wolman 
shocks to the rate of  time preference, or changing preferences over consump- 
tion versus saving in the private sector. With these real shocks, the first-best 
equilibrium is still stable prices that undo the distortions associated with the 
reasons  for  price  stickiness.  Introducing  nominal  wage  inflexibility  does 
change the conclusion. If the relevant nominal inflexibility was in wages, com- 
plete nominal wage stability would probably be first best undoing that distor- 
tion, meaning that in response to a technology shock the price level would 
move. In particular, with a negative supply shock prices should be allowed to 
go up, but only by a certain amount once. So there will not be persistent infla- 
tion, which is quite different from the monetary policy responses to supply 
shocks in the 1970s. 
Robert King broadly agreed with the comments made by  Friedman about 
the sensitivity of the price-level-targeting result to the nature of nominal rigidi- 
ties. But he argued that the methods of the paper should be applied to models 
with alternative nominal rigidities, such as sticky wages, to determine the ex- 
tent of such policy sensitivity. 
On the time-consistency issue, King made the observation that there was 
uncertainty about whether Alan Greenspan would continue as chairman of the 
Federal Reserve or would be replaced by  a new chairman who was less con- 
cerned with low inflation. During the intense public discussion of this topic, 
the long rate of  interest went up  100 basis points, indicating that the time- 
inconsistency issue was still unresolved. 
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